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Abstract: This article takes stock of the basic notions of Information Structure (IS). It first
provides a general characterization of IS—following Chafe (1976)—within a communicative
model of Common Ground (CG), which distinguishes between CG content and CG manage-
ment. IS is concerned with those features of language that affect the local CG. Second, this
paper defines and discusses the notions of Focus (as indicating alternatives) and its various
uses, Givenness (as indicating that a denotation is already present in the CG), and Topic (as
specifying what a statement is about). It also proposes a new notion, Delimitation, which
comprises contrastive topics and frame setters, and indicates that the current conversational
move does not entirely satisfy the local communicative needs. It also points out that rhetori-
cal structuring partly belongs to IS.
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1. Introduction
The basic notions of Information Structure (IS), such as Focus, Topic and
Givenness, are not simple observational terms. As scientiﬁc notions, they
are rooted in theory, in this case, in theories of how communication works.
Hence this paper necessarily will make certain theoretical assumptions,
without going into great details or formal modelling. I will motivate
the selection of IS notions in the tradition of Chafe (1976) who talked
about IS as a phenomenon of information packaging that responds to the
immediate communicative needs of interlocutors. I do this within the
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model of communication as continuous change of the common ground
(CG), where it will be crucial to distinguish between CG content and
what I will call CG management.
IS is a vast topic of research that has been pursued within diﬀerent
theoretical frameworks, and has produced numerous empirical insights.
This short paper cannot conclusively argue for its choices in detail, vis-à-
vis other theoretical options, or attempt to motivate them by considering
phenomena in a wider range of languages. In spite of this, I hope that a
coherent and attractive theoretical landscape emerges for IS research.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. What is Information Structure?
In his seminal 1976 paper on notions of IS, Chafe introduced the notion
of packaging of the information conveyed in an utterance that, to my
mind, still provides useful guidance for our understanding of IS. Chafe
wisely restricted his notion of IS to those aspects that respond to the
temporary state of the addressee’s mind, thus excluding several other
aspects of messages, like reference to long-term background knowledge,
choice of language style or level of politeness that otherwise could be
understood as packaging as well.
One problem with Chafe’s approach is that there are aspects of opti-
mization of the message that, on the one hand, respond to the temporary
state of the addressee’s mind, but on the other also aﬀect the message it-
self, and hence cannot be treated as pure packaging. For example, Focus,
as expressed by sentence accent in English, can be used for information
packaging, as in answers to questions, cf. (1), but can also lead to truth-
conditional diﬀerences, as when associated with focus-sensitive particles
like only, cf. (2).
(a)(1) A: What did John show Mary?
B: John showed Mary [the PICtures]F.
(b) A: Who did John show the pictures?
B: John showed [MAry]F the pictures.
(a)(2) John only showed Mary [the PICtures]F.
(b) John only showed [MAry]F the pictures.
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The truth conditions of B’s answers in (1) arguably are the same, whereas
the truth conditions of (2) diﬀer. One and the same linguistic device,
sentence accent, can be used for packaging as well as for constructing the
content. There are two possible ways of dealing with this multiple use of
features such as accent: One is to assume that the two uses of the same
feature are essentially unrelated, just as the uses of accent in English to
express focus and to distinguish words such as REcord and reCORD. The
other is to assume that the feature is to be interpreted in a particular
way that makes sense for the purposes of information packaging as well as
of building information content. For methodological reasons the second
alternative appears to be more attractive: If it can be shown that one and
the same interpretation of a feature has multiple uses, then this option
should be favored over the assumption of multiple interpretations. We
will see that focus indeed can be interpreted in this way.
2.2. Common ground: Content and management
If we are to talk about communication as transfer of information and its
optimization relative to the temporary needs of interlocutors, it is useful
to adopt a model of information exchange that makes use of the notion
of Common Ground (CG). The original notion of CG (cf. Stalnaker 1974;
Karttunen 1974; Lewis 1979) saw it as a way to model the information
that is mutually known to be shared and that is continuously modiﬁed
in communication. This allowed for a promising way of modeling the
distinction between presuppositions, as requirements for the input CG,
and assertions or the proffered content, as the proposed change in the
output CG. This distinction is relevant for information packaging, as
the CG changes continuously, and information has to be packaged in
correspondence with the CG at the point at which it is uttered. For
example, it can be explained why (3a) is ﬁne but (3b) is odd: In (3a),
the ﬁrst clause introduces the information that the speaker has a cat, to
which the presupposition of the second clause appeals. This contrasts
with (3b), as the second sentence introduces the information that the
speaker has a cat which is already present in the input CG at this point
(cf. van der Sandt 1988).
(a)(3) I have a cat, and I had to bring my cat to the vet.
(b)#I had to bring my cat to the vet, and I have a cat.
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Already when the notion of CG was introduced, it was pointed out that
speakers could change CG by accommodation of presupposition. That is,
uncontroversial facts can be added implicitly to the CG by requiring the
input CG to be of a certain kind. This is why (4a) is good but (4b) is bad:
(a)(4) I had to bring my cat to the vet because it was sick.
(b) I had to bring my gorilla to the vet because it was sick.
The notion of CG had ﬁrst been applied to factual information, but it
soon got extended to discourse referents (in particular, by Kamp 1981 and
Heim 1982). That is, CG does not only consist of a set of propositions
that is presumed to be mutually accepted (or the conjunction of this set,
one proposition), but also of a set of entities that have been introduced
into the CG before. Such entities can be explicitly introduced, e.g., by
an indeﬁnite NP, or they can be accommodated, as in (4a). They can be
taken up by pronouns, as in the second clause of (4a), or by deﬁnite NPs,
which express requirements to the input CG. The choice of anaphoric
expression depends on the recency of the antecedent, again a notion that
falls squarely within Chafe’s notion of packaging.
The properties of CG mentioned so far all had to do with the truth-
conditional information in the CG, so we can subsume them under the
heading of CG content. But any ecologically valid notion of CG must
also contain information about the manifest communicative interests and
goals of the participants. For example, questions typically do not add fac-
tual information to the common ground, but indicate informational needs
on the side of one participant that should be satisﬁed by a conversational
move of the other. I propose to call this dimension of the common ground
CG management, as it is concerned with the way the CG content should
develop. Just as CG content, CG management is supposed to be shared,
with the understanding that the responsibility for it may be asymmetri-
cally distributed among participants, e.g., if one person asks questions,
and the other supplies the answers. There is a wide variety of studies
that can be captured under the notion of CG management, some formal
such as Merin (1994) or Groenendĳk (1999), some less formal such as
Clark (1996) and studies of Conversational Analysis such as Hutchby–
Wooﬃtt (1988). The distinction between CG content and CG manage-
ment is important for our purposes, as we can associate those aspects of
IS that have truth-conditional impact with CG content, and those which
relate to the pragmatic use of expressions with CG management.
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2.3. Expressions and what they stand for
Before we discuss speciﬁc notions of IS, I would like to mention a termino-
logical problem. We often ﬁnd that the distinction between an expression
and what it stands for, its denotatum, is not made. For example, in a sen-
tence like (9), the expression as for the beans, or the beans, may be called
the ‘topic’ of the sentence, but then quite often the beans themselves are
called its ‘topic’.
(5) As for the beans, John ate them.
For some reason, this confusion of expression and meaning occurs par-
ticularly often for IS notions. For notions like ‘subject’, ‘predicate’ or
‘direct object’ it does not arise; no one would claim that John the person
is the grammatical subject of (9), it is John the noun phrase. We can
live with the imprecision of IS terms if we are aware of it. But in any
instance in which it is relevant, it is important to make the intended in-
terpretation clear. For example, we can speak of (as for) the beans as the
‘topic constituent’ of the sentence, or as a ‘topic expression’, and of the
beans that it refers to, or of the discourse referents anchored to them, as
the ‘topic referents’ or ‘topic denotation’.
3. Focus
3.1. What is Focus?
The most successful understanding of focus, to my mind, is captured by
the following deﬁnition, which will presently be rendered more precise.
(6) Focus indicates the presence of alternatives that are relevant for the interpretation
of linguistic expressions.
This is the central claim of Alternative Semantics (Rooth 1985; 1992).1
The rather general deﬁnition does not say anything about how focus is
marked; in fact it is compatible with diﬀerent markings. However, it
demands that we should only use terms like ‘focus marking’ or ‘focus
construction’ to indicate that alternatives play a role in interpretation.
1 But it is not necessarily tied to the representation of focus that this theory
proposes.
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It might well be that diﬀerent ways of focus marking signal diﬀerent ways
of how alternatives are exploited; e.g., focus marking by cleft sentences
often signals an exhaustive interpretation that in-situ focus lacks. We can
then speak about subtypes of focus, such as cleft focus and in-situ-focus
that may employ the alternatives in more speciﬁc ways. Also, (6) allows
for languages to diﬀer in the ways they mark focus and in the speciﬁc
interpretational eﬀects of focus. This is in no way diﬀerent from other
linguistic categories, such as case or gender. But it seems reasonable, and
consistent with current uses of the term, to use ‘focus’ exactly in those
cases that satisfy (6).2 The following sections will show that all current
uses of the term can be subsumed under (6).
3.2. Expression focus and denotation focus
Deﬁnition (6) is silent about the nature of the alternatives that are rel-
evant for interpretation. In fact, the alternatives may be alternatives
of form or of denotation. This suggests the following way to make (6)
more precise:
(7) A property F of an expression a is a Focus property iff F signals
(a) that alternatives of (parts of) the expression a or
(b) alternatives of the denotation of (parts of) a
are relevant for the interpretation of a.
I call the ﬁrst case, (7a), expression focus. The expression alternatives
can aﬀect a variety of aspects, like choice of words and pronunciation,
and they do not even have to involve constituents or meaningful units.
Focus on expressions is typically used for corrections, and often, but not
necessarily, comes with an overt negation (cf. Horn 1985 on metalinguistic
negation). Two examples:
(8) Grandpa didn’t [kick the BUcket]F, he [passed aWAY]F.
(9) A: They live in BERlin.
B: They live in [BerLIN]F!
2 It should be pointed out that there are cases in which alternatives that are not
indicated by focus play a role. For example, the standard theory of scalar im-
plicatures assumes that they arise due to alternatives to an expression ordered
by a Horn scale, and these alternatives do not have to be focused. For instance,
John or Mary will come implicates that not both of them will, as or has and as
its alternative, but clearly, or does not have to be focused.
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In (8) the relevant alternatives of both foci are the expressions {kick the
bucket, pass away}. It cannot be their denotations, as they are identical,
the property die. The expressions diﬀer, among other things, in their
connotations, which is the feature in which they are contrasted here, so
what is contrasted cannot just be their denotation. In (9) the relevant
alternatives are the expressions {BERlin, BerLIN} that only diﬀer in
their accent and speaker B corrects speaker A by supplying the form
that B thinks has the right accent structure.
Expression focus is typically marked in-situ, not by clefts or other
types of movement. It can focus on constituents below the word level,
and it can be deeply embedded within a sentence. This follows from
the assumption that expression focus aﬀects surface representations of
linguistic objects. The typical use of expression focus is the rejection of
a string [a1. . . ai,F. . . an] in favor of a string [a1. . . a′i,F. . . an], where focus
identiﬁes the substring to be replaced and its replacement.
I will call the second case, (7b), denotation focus. Here, the rel-
evant alternatives are construed on the level of denotations, leading to
alternative denotations of complex expressions. Denotation focus on an
expression a with a meaning JaK leads to the assumption of a set of alter-
native meanings that play a role in the interpretation of the constituent in
which a occurs. The alternative denotations have to be comparable to the
denotation of the expression in focus, that is, they have to be of the same
type, and often also of the same ontological sort (e.g., persons or times),
and they can be more narrowly restricted by the context of utterance.
In the following, I will concentrate on denotation focus, which is
certainly more important in communication.
3.3. Semantic vs. pragmatic uses of focus: CG content
vs. CG management
We now turn to the notion of interpretation of the linguistic expression a
that ﬁgured in deﬁnition (12). It is useful to explicate this notion within
the general theory of Common Ground (CG) introduced in section 2.2,
where we also introduced the distinction between CG content and CG
management. This diﬀerentiation is useful to distinguish between two
quite diﬀerent uses of focus: So-called pragmatic uses of focus relate
to the common communicative goals of the participants, the CG man-
agement, whereas so-called semantic uses of focus relate to the factual
information, the CG content.
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The pragmatic use of focus does not have an immediate inﬂuence on
truth conditions, but it helps in guiding the direction into which com-
munication should develop, and it also aids in building the cognitive rep-
resentations that are to be constructed by the interlocutors. Failing to
select the right focus typically results in incoherent communication. The
semantic use of focus, on the other hand, aﬀects the truth-conditional
content of the CG. Failing to set focus right will result in transmitting
unintended factual information. The two uses of focus cannot always be
neatly separated, but there are prototypical cases that clearly belong to
one or to the other category, to which we now turn.
3.4. Pragmatic uses of focus
The classical pragmatic use of focus is to highlight the part of an answer
that corresponds to the wh-part of a constituent question (Paul 1880).
This can be captured in a straightforward way within our model of CG
change.
A question changes the current CG in such a way as to indicate the
communicative goal of the questioner. Following Hamblin (1973) we can
model this eﬀect by interpreting a question as a set of propositions, each
being the denotation of a congruent answer.
(10) A: Who stole the cookie?
Hamblin meaning: {stole(cookie)(x) | x ∈ person}
The answer identiﬁes one of these propositions and adds it to the CG
content; this is the job of the ‘ordinary meaning’ in Alternative Semantics.
Focus induces alternatives that correspond to the Hamblin meaning of
questions; in the theory of Rooth (1992), the alternative set is a superset
of the question set:
(11) B: [PEter]F stole the cookie.
Ordinary meaning of the answer: stole(cookie)(peter)
Focus-induced alternatives: {stole(cookie)(x) | x ∈ entity3}
The formation of the question, as well as the construction of the focus-
induced alternatives of the answers, clearly belongs to CG management,
not to CG content. The question speciﬁes the way in which the CG
3 The focus is not restricted to person, diﬀerent from the question (10), in which
the wh-word who enforces this restriction.
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should develop in the immediate future; the answer relates an expression
to the immediately preceding context. Obviously, focus in answers is
an information-packaging device in the sense of Chafe, as it corresponds
to the current CG, and the formation of questions, as a device of CG
management, can be seen as part of information packaging as well.
We might ask at this point why there is marking of question-answer
congruence in the ﬁrst place. Its raison d’être most likely is that it
allows to accommodate the meaning of the questions that are not overtly
expressed. That is, it allows to accommodate CG management. For
example, the accent structure in (17) can be understood in such a way
that the second clause leads to the accommodation of a question, what
did you do first.
(12) I built a St. Martin’s lantern with my kids. First, I [built the BOdy of the lantern
with some CARDboard paper]F.
A variety of theories have assumed that coherent discourse is structured
by such implicit questions (e.g., Klein–von Stutterheim 1987; van Kup-
pevelt 1994; Roberts 1996; Büring 2003), and focus in the answers to such
explicit questions may well help the addressee to construct what the in-
tended questions were.4 Under this understanding, all cases of so-called
‘presentational’ or ‘information’ focus which is claimed to express the
most important part of the utterance, or what is new in the utterance,
can be subsumed under the use of alternatives to indicate covert questions
suggested by the context. The following examples suggest questions like
What happened?, What was there?, andWhat did she do?, which explains
the types of foci suggested for the second clauses.
(a)(13) And then something strange happened. [A MEterorite fell down]F.
(b) Once upon a time, there was [a PRINcess]F.
(c) Mary sat down at her desk. She [took out a pile of NOTES]F.
Other pragmatic uses of focus are to correct and confirm information. In
cases like (14B,B′) the focus alternatives must include a proposition that
has been proposed in the immediately preceding CG. It is expressed that
4 It should be stressed that we should not expect this use of focus to be univer-
sal; just as some languages use gender information to express pronoun binding
and others do not, the use of focus to mark Q/A-coherence may be restricted.
Findings about languages such as Hausa (Hartmann–Zimmermann 2007) and
Northern Sotho (Zerbian 2006) suggest that this is the case.
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among the alternatives the ordinary meaning is the only one that holds.
This leads to a corrective interpretation in case the context proposition
diﬀered, cf. (14B), and to a conﬁrmative interpretation in case the context
proposition was the same, cf. (14B′). In the latter case, the wider CG
must be such that other alternatives are under consideration as well,
which are then explicitly excluded. Again, focus in this use restricts the
possible contexts, and presumably aids interpretation.
(14) A: Mary stole the cookie.
B: (No,) [PEter]F stole the cookie!
B′: Yes, [MAry]F stole the cookie.
Another pragmatic use of focus is in highlighting parallels in interpre-
tations. This can aﬀect whole clauses as in (15a) or parts of clauses as
in (15b). As in the previous cases, focus creates alternatives, with the
pragmatic requirement that some of these alternatives are also evoked in
the immediately surrounding contexts. In addition, the parallel expres-
sions are required to have the same set of alternatives. In the case of
(15a), both clauses evoke the set {stole(x)(y)|x, y ∈ entity}. In the
case of (15b), the alternatives have to be constructed more locally, for
which Rooth (1992) introduces an anaphoric operator C, which would
presumably ﬁgure at the level of the NP or DP here. The NP-level al-
ternatives are {P(farmer) | P ∈ nationality}, a set of predicates like
american(farmer), canadian(farmer), etc.
(a)(15) MAry stole the COOkie and PEter stole the CHOcolate.
(b) An AMErican farmer talked to a CaNAdian farmer,. . .
The use of focus to express parallel structures is perhaps one of the least
understood aspects of focus. Focus appears to be less obligatory here
than in the other cases. Presumably focus assists in constructing mental
models of the described scene by associating the contrasted meanings
with each other.
Yet another pragmatic use of focus is to make the addressee aware
of a delimitation of the utterance to the constituent in focus. This use
subsumes, in particular, cases of contrastive topics such as John in (16a),
but also focus in frame setting expressions as my in (16b). I will come
back to this in section 6.2.
(a)(16) As for JOHN, he was seen in the KITchen.
(b) In MY opinion, JOHN stole the cookies.
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With these types (answers to overt or covert questions, including selec-
tions from a list of items speciﬁed in the question, corrections, conﬁrma-
tions, parallels, and delimitation) we have covered the main pragmatic
uses of focus. We turn to those uses of focus that have an immediate
truth-conditional eﬀect, that is, that directly inﬂuence CG content.
3.5. Semantic uses of focus
We say that semantic operators whose interpretational eﬀects depend on
focus are associated with focus. The best-known cases are focus-sensitive
particles like only, also and even. There exists a variety of theories for
the meaning of such particles, but they generally resort to the notion
of alternatives, which, as we have seen above, also is central for the
pragmatic uses of focus. In the case of exclusive particles like only, it is
stated that the focus denotation is the only one among the alternatives
that leads to a true assertion; additive particles like also express the
presupposition that the assertion holds for other alternatives; and scalar
particles like even presuppose that the denotation of the focus constituent
is extreme when compared to other alternatives (cf. e.g., Jacobs 1983;
König 1991).
But do these particles indeed aﬀect the truth-conditional meaning?
It is interesting to note that the focus information of additive and scalar
particles does not aﬀect the output CG, but rather restricts the input CG,
as the alternatives are used to impose presuppositions. In particular,
additive particles are close to a use within CG management, as they
indicate that a proposition with an alternative to the item in focus had
been expressed before or is part of the CG.
(17) [JOHN]F stole a cookie, and [PEter]F, TOO,
5 stole a cookie.
Negation has been analyzed as a focus-sensitive particle as well. Pre-
sumably these cases can be subsumed under corrections, and hence they
might rather belong to the CG management use of focus. In the following
example, it is negated that Bill stole the cookie, with the contextual re-
quirement that precisely this has been claimed or appears to be inferable.
(18) Not [BILL]F stole the cookie, but [JOHN]F.
5 As for a theory that explains accent on too, cf. Krifka (1999).
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But there are a number of clear cases in which alternatives are used for
semantic purposes. For example, reason clauses as in (19), a variation of
a counterfactual example of Dretske (1972), or operators like fortunately
necessarily contrast alternatives with each other.
(19)
(
Clyde had to marry [BERtha]F
Clyde had to [MARry]F Bertha
)
in order to be eligible for the inheritance.
(20) Fortunately, Bill spilled [WHITE]F wine on the carpet.
For example, (20) says that among the two alternatives, john spilled
red wine and john spilled white wine, the latter one was more
fortunate (but of course that wine was spilled at all was still unfortunate).
Hence, fortunate expresses a comparison between the denotation of the
focus and the denotation of the alternatives, a genuinely semantic use
of focus.
Rooth (1985) has suggested that focus helps in determining the
restrictor of quantiﬁers, in particular adverbial quantiﬁers, and then
has truth-conditional impact as well. For example, focus has truth-
conditional impact in (21); focus on q instead would result in the diﬀerent,
and false, reading that every u is preceded by a q.
(21) In English orthography, a [U ]F always follows a q.
‘Whenever a q precedes an {a, b, c, d, . . ., z}, then it precedes a u.’
One important fact about focus-sensitive operators is that they have to be
in a position in which they can scope over their focus. For example, only
in (22) could associate with Mary, with to Sue, with introduced or with
introduced Mary to Sue, but not with John as it does not c-command
John on any level of representation.
(22) John only introduced Mary to Sue.
Yet it should be stressed that the notion of focus does not coincide with
the notion of scope. For example, while the focus of only in (23a) and
(23b) is the same, their scopes diﬀer, leading to distinct interpretations.
(a)(23) Mary only said that JOHN stole a cookie.
‘Mary didn’t say of anyone but John that he stole a cookie.’
(b) Mary said that only JOHN stole a cookie.
‘Mary said that nobody but John stole a cookie.’
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It is conceivable that semantic uses of focus can be traced back to prag-
matic uses. The underlying idea is as follows: The notion of alternatives
to what is said was ﬁrst used for pragmatic purposes, to convey additional
meanings by making explicit that certain expressions were considered
but not uttered, presumably because they were false or not informative
enough. Once established, alternatives were used for operators that, due
to their meaning, required reference to sets of denotations. In some cases,
like additive particles and contrastive negation, this change from prag-
matic exploitation of alternatives to semantic exploitation appears to be
quite straightforward; in other cases, as in (20) and (21), the details of
such a development are considerably less obvious. Such change of the
communicative impact of expressions is a common phenomenon that can
be observed in the development of word meaning (cf. Levinson 2000 for
pragmatically induced changes) and the semantization of implicatures
(cf. Chierchia 2004).
It might be suggestive to distinguish between pragmatic and seman-
tic focus by stating that the latter type of focus associates with an oper-
ator, while the former does not. But then we can assume illocutionary
operators such as assertion or denial that make use of the alternatives
introduced by focus, and we can say that focus is bound to such oper-
ators (cf. Jacobs 1984), hence this is not a valid criterion to distinguish
between pragmatic and semantic uses.
3.6. Comparison with alternative notions of focus
The notion of focus has been explicated in a variety of ways, in particular
as ‘highlighting’ the ‘most important’ or ‘new’ information in an utter-
ance. While such explications are intuitively appealing and may apply to
a majority of cases, I consider them unsatisfactory as deﬁnitions. The no-
tion of highlighting is a particularly unclear one that is hardly predictive
as long as we do not have a worked-out theory of what highlighting is.
I am also not aware of any worked-out theory of communication that has
made clear what ‘importance’ means, let alone one that has introduced a
graded notion of importance. Even on an intuitive level, the notion of im-
portance is diﬃcult to apply. In which sense is John the most important
part in (24)? Isn’t it most important that someone else stole the cookie?
(24) It wasn’t JOHN who stole the cookie.
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As for the third, the notion of ‘newness’ has been defended most often
in quite diﬀerent frameworks, ranging from Halliday’s ‘information fo-
cus’ (cf. Halliday 1967) to the Prague school (Sgall et al. 1986) and to
Jackendoﬀ (1972). But it clearly gives us wrong predictions. There are
many cases in which a constituent that refers to something previously
mentioned is in focus. One might say that what is new in (39) is not
John, or the expression John, but the information that John satisﬁes the
description x stole the cookie.
(25) A: Who stole the cookie, John or Mary?
B: JOHN stole the cookie.
When Jackendoﬀ (1972) deﬁnes as ‘information focus’ the information
that is not shared by speaker and addressee, then we must say something
like the following: It is shared information in (25) that John or Mary stole
the cookie. The diﬀerence between this shared information and what the
sentence says, that John stole the cookie, is a more speciﬁc proposition.
But not just any more speciﬁc proposition would do; it must be one that
is more speciﬁc in a particular dimension, indicated by the focus. This
leads to the idea that focus indicates an existential presupposition (cf.
Geurts–van der Sandt 2004). If we have a sentence with a focus [. . . aF. . . ]
then this sentence comes with the presupposition ∃x[. . .x. . . ], where x
replaces the denotation of a in the representation of the denotation of
[. . . aF. . . ]. For example, (24) and (25) presuppose that someone stole
the cookie, and in many other types of uses of focus we plausibly can
assume existence presuppositions. But existence presuppositions do not
arise with every use of focus, as in the following examples:
(26) Not even [MAry]F managed to solve the problem.
(27) A: Who, if anyone, has solved this problem?
B: [NO one]F solved this problem.
If focus indicates the presence of alternatives, as suggested here, we can
see why the other explanations make sense to some degree. The focus
denotation typically feels highlighted because it is contrasted with the
other alternatives; the selection of this denotation over alternative ones
is often felt to be the most important contribution in a sentence; and
the selected alternative is often also new (not mentioned previously).
Also, in many cases it is already established in the CG content that
the proposition applies to one alternative, but it is still open to which
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one. But this does not mean that highlighting, importance, newness, or
presupposition of existence should ﬁgure in the deﬁnition of focus. They
are statistical correlates, but not deﬁnitional features, of focus. Using
them to deﬁne focus is similar to using the notion of deﬁniteness to deﬁne
subjects: The great majority of subjects in running text are deﬁnite, but
in many languages indeﬁnite subjects are allowed.
3.7. Further focus types
I have argued that focus in general indicates the presence of alterna-
tives for interpretation. Subtypes of focus then all are variations of this
underlying idea. We have distinguished between expression focus and
denotation focus according to the nature of the items in focus, and we
have distinguished between pragmatic focus and semantic focus accord-
ing to the general ways in which focus-induced alternatives are used—
whether they make a truth-conditional diﬀerence or not. There are a
number of additional criteria that can be applied to classify either the
kind of alternatives or their use.
Starting with the type of alternatives, we have seen that constituents
of diﬀerent sizes can be put into focus: whole sentences, subconstituents
like VPs or DPs, parts of DPs like adjectives or demonstratives. Some-
times terms like broad and narrow focus are used (cf. Selkirk 1984; Lam-
brecht 1994), but it should be clear that these are imprecise terms that
can only be applied when diﬀerent focus alternatives are under discussion.
The position of the accent is determined by rules of accent percolation
(also known as ‘focus projection’), which leads to well-known ambigui-
ties of focus marking (cf. Gussenhoven 1983; 1992; Selkirk 1984; 1995).
For example, if a transitive VP is in focus then accent is realized on the
argument, which also would signal narrow focus on the argument. For
denotation focus it holds that whatever is in focus must be a meaning-
ful unit, as denotational focus contrasts diﬀerent meanings. An extreme
case is so-called verum focus, focus on the truth value of a sentence,
which may be expressed by accenting an auxiliary (as in She DOES like
broccoli). It is an interesting issue whether parts of words can be put in
focus. Paul (1880) has proposed this for a word like fahren ‘to move in
a land- or sea-bound vehicle’, where according to him it is possible that
only the manner component is in focus, which is phonologically indis-
tinguishable from focus on the whole denotation. I think that cases like
this do not force us to assume lexical decomposition; we can also assume
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that the alternatives are restricted to denotations of verbs of locomotion
like fahren, gehen, reiten. Another type of sublexical focus is illustrated
in We only saw stalagMITES in the cave, no stalagTITES, where the
accent highlights a part that does not carry meaning. As Artstein (2005)
argues, this can be explained by a principle stating that accent creates
maximally distinct representations for the focus and its alternatives.
It sometimes happens that one operator makes use of a combination
of foci, resulting in complex focus:
(28) John only introduced BILL to SUE.
This says: The only pair 〈x, y〉 such that John introduced x to y is 〈bill,
sue〉. It cannot be reduced to single foci; in particular, the sentence
means something diﬀerent from the following:
(29) John only introduced BILL only to SUE.
(29) is a case of multiple focus, in which in one and the same sentence,
one expression introduces alternatives that are exploited in one way, and
another expression introduces alternatives that are exploited in a diﬀerent
way. (29) can be paraphrased as: The only x such that John introduced
x to Sue and no one else is x = Bill. The ﬁrst only scopes over the second,
and this is reﬂected by focus marking: Accent on Bill is stronger than
accent on Sue, in contrast to the complex focus case of (28), where both
accents are felt to be equally strong.
Another distinction relating to types of alternatives concerns the
issue of the size of the alternative set. Sometimes this set is limited to a
few items, perhaps down to the minimal number of two, the item in focus
and one alternative. This is often the case in corrections or contrasts,
in polarity questions that expect a positive or a negative answer, or in
answers to alternative questions or restricted constituent questions such
as the following:
(30) A: What do you want to drink, tea or coﬀee?
B: I want [TEA]F.
At other times the alternative set is unrestricted, satisfying just the gen-
eral condition that all the alternatives must be compatible with the focus
in their semantic type. It is tempting to call focus with a limited set of
alternatives contrastive (as suggested by Chafe 1976), but (30B) doesn’t
seem to be more contrastive than an answer to the non-restricted ques-
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tion What do you want to drink? I would rather suggest to distinguish
between closed alternatives and open alternatives, and talk about closed
vs. open focus, when necessary.
The notion of contrastive focus I would like to restrict to focus used
for truly contrastive purposes, which presupposes that the CG content
contains a proposition with which the current utterance can be con-
trasted, or that such a proposition can be accommodated (cf. Jacobs
1988). Notice that in (30), it is CG management, not CG content that
contains such a proposition. The typical use of contrastive focus is cor-
rective, but it can also be additive, as in A: John wants coffee. B: MAry
wants coffee, TOO. There is evidence for particular marking strategies for
contrastive focus like the use of particular syntactic positions or of special
prosodic patterns, see e.g., Selkirk (2002); Molnár (2001); Gussenhoven
(2004).
Another type of focus that refers to the speciﬁc interpretation of the
alternative’s contribution is exhaustive focus. It indicates that the focus
denotation is the only one that leads to a true proposition, or rather more
generally: that the focus denotation is the logically strongest that does so.
É. Kiss (1998) has pointed out that focus movement in Hungarian triggers
this speciﬁc meaning, and it appears that cleft constructions in English
trigger it as well:
(31) It’s [JOHN and BILL]F that stole a cookie.
This example says that nobody else but John and Bill stole a cookie.
Consequently, exhaustive focus is not compatible with additive particles,
like too. I do not see a good reason to introduce, in addition to exhaus-
tive focus, the notion of identiﬁcation focus that expresses an identity
statement, as in The ones who stole a cookie are John and Bill.
As a ﬁnal focus type I would like to mention scalar focus, also called
emphatic focus. In this case, the alternatives are ordered, and the focus
denotation often is the least or greatest element. Scalar particles like
even or at least require scalar focus, as well as strong polarity items such
as in [Wild HORses]F wouldn’t drag me there.
3.8. Representation formats for focus
There are a number of ways in which the alternatives introduced by focus
can be represented within a formal framework of semantic interpretation.
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These representations are not independent of the possible interpretations
of focus, and hence should be discussed here.
Alternative Semantics (Rooth 1985; 1992) assumes two levels of in-
terpretation, the ordinary level and the level of alternatives. They are
construed in parallel, and operators that exploit focus refer to both the
ordinary meaning and the alternatives. The construction mechanism is
particularly simple and incorporates the idea of focus introducing alter-
natives in a natural way, in the sense that it could not even represent
anything else besides alternatives. The theory also predicts that focus-
sensitive operators have to be in a position in which they can scope over
their focus.6 However, Alternative Semantics has only limited means to
express that two foci belong together, as in the case of complex focus, and
it is insuﬃcient in certain cases of multiple focus (cf. von Stechow 1990;
Kratzer 1994; Krifka 2001). The reason is that in Alternative Seman-
tics, the focus denotations are not directly accessible to focus-sensitive
operators; the operators can only access the eﬀects that the focus alter-
natives had on the meanings of expressions. The set of alternatives of
the following example with a complex focus is a set of propositions:
(32) [John introduced BILLF to SUEF].
Meaning: introduced(bill)(sue)(john)
Alternatives: {introduced(x)(y)(john) | x, y ∈ D}
= {introduced(bill)(sue)(john),
introduced(bill)(mary)(john),
introduced(jim)(sue)(john),
introduced(jim)(mary)(john), . . . }
The Structured Meaning approach to focus (von Stechow 1990; Krifka
1991) assumes that focusing leads to a partition of meanings into a focus
part and a background part that, when applied to the focus denotation,
yields the ordinary interpretation. (32) would get the following represen-
tation, where background and focus are represented by a pair, 〈B, F〉.
(33) 〈l〈x, y〉[introduced(x)(y)(john)], 〈bill, sue〉〉
The notion of background corresponds to the one of presupposition skele-
ton of Jackendoﬀ (1972); notice that there is no corresponding notion
within Alternative Semantics. The structuring can be triggered by syn-
tactic movement of the focus item, as overtly done in focus movement, or
6 This does not necessarily hold for the version of Rooth (1992), where focus is
mediated via anaphoric relations.
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by some equivalent operation. The Structured Meaning representation
can express multiple focus and complex focus, but the representation for-
mat is not particularly tied to the notion of alternatives. It has to be
stipulated that focus-sensitive operators are only allowed to express op-
erations that relate a focus denotation to its alternatives (cf. Rooth 1995,
who discusses this problem with a hypothetical verbal predicate, tolfed).
There is another framework of focus representation, In-Situ Binding
Semantics, as developed in Wold (1996), whose representational complex-
ity lies in between Alternative Semantics and Structured Meanings. It
does not allow direct access to the focus denotation, but has a notion of
background that makes it possible to refer to the position in which foci
are interpreted, and hence is able to express dependencies between foci.
It might well be that we need more than one representation format
to cover diﬀerent aspects of focus. In particular, we might argue that
focus marked by overt movement into a cleft position or dedicated focus
position should be captured by Structured Meanings as this reﬂects the
syntactic structures involved and thus predicts certain syntactic island
restrictions. It is an open debate whether cases of in-situ focus should be
modeled by covert movement on LF, as the Structured Meaning approach
does. On the one hand, it was pointed out early on that syntactic island
restrictions in association with focus phenomena appear to be lacking (cf.
Jackendoﬀ 1972); on the other hand, it has been argued that they are
in fact present (Drubig 1994). The discussion revolves around examples
of the following kind:
(34) John didn’t introduce Bill to [the woman he met at SUE’s party]
(but *MAry’s/the woman he met at MAry’s party).
It appears that the negation associates with focus on Sue, violating is-
land restrictions. But then the but-phrase has to take up the whole
constituent, not just the focus. This has been taken as evidence that
the negation associates with the whole bracketed NP, not just with Sue.
We can distinguish between a focus phrase (here, the woman he met at
SUE’sF party) that contains a focus, which in turn determines the alterna-
tives to the focus phrase. In the majority of cases, focus and focus phrase
coincide, but not always, as (34) illustrates. As the focus can be deeply
embedded within the focus phrase, this suggests a hybrid representation
of focus: The relation between focus and focus phrase is mediated by
the mechanisms of Alternative Semantics, and the relation between focus
phrase and focus-sensitive operator is mediated by Structured Meanings
(cf. Krifka 2006).
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4. Givenness
4.1. What is Givenness?
We now turn to the second important category of IS, the indication that
the denotation of an expression is present in the immediate CG content.
Givenness was prominently treated by Chafe (1976), and there is ample
evidence that human languages have devices with which speakers can
make addressees aware that something that is present in the immediate
linguistic context is taken up again.
The proper deﬁnition of Givenness must be such that it allows us to
say that an expression is given to a particular degree, e.g., whether it is
maximally salient in the immediate CG or just present there, or whether
it is given in the general CG or not given at all. The following attempt
at a general deﬁnition accounts for that distinction.
(35) A feature X of an expression a is a Givenness feature iff X indicates whether the
denotation of a is present in the CG or not, and/or indicates the degree to which it
is present in the immediate CG.
With Focus we distinguished between expression focus and denotation
focus. We do not have to make this distinction here, as Givenness always
refers to denotations, never to expressions. There are two groups of
phenomena that refer to Givenness, namely speciﬁc anaphoric expressions
that have givenness features as part of their lexical speciﬁcation, and
other grammatical devices such as deaccentuation, ordering and deletion
that can mark arbitrary constituents as given. I will deal with them
in turn.
4.2. Anaphoric expressions
These are speciﬁc linguistic forms that indicate the givenness status of
their denotations, including personal pronouns, clitics and person inﬂec-
tion, demonstratives, deﬁnite articles, but also indeﬁnite articles that
indicate that their referent is not given. Deﬁnite articles can be used to
indicate whether a denotation is given in a CG in general, whereas clitics
and pronouns typically indicate that their denotations are given in the
immediate CG.
There is a large literature on anaphoric devices, which I cannot even
start to do justice to here. But I want to point out that speakers typ-
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ically have a hierarchy of distinct linguistic means at their disposal (as
zero forms, clitics, pronouns, demonstratives. . . ), and that denotations
in the immediate CG are ranked with respect to their givenness sta-
tus such that simpler anaphoric expressions are used to refer to more
salient denotations (cf. Prince 1981; Gundel et al. 1993). This insight
has been implemented within Centering Theory, which has developed
formal means to model the dynamic change of the saliency of discourse
referents in communication (cf. papers in Walker et al. 1998).
4.3. Deaccentuation, deletion and word order
There are three other ways to indicate Givenness: Deaccentuation, the
reduction of the prosodic realization of expressions that are given in the
immediate context; deletion, which can be seen as an extreme form of
reduction; and the realization of an expression in a non-canonical posi-
tion, typically before the canonical position. This is illustrated in the
following examples:
(a)(36) Ten years after John inherited an old farm, he sold [the shed]Given.
(b) Bill went to Greenland, and Mary did too.
(c) Bill showed the boy a girl.
*Bill showed a boy the girl.
Bill showed the girl to a boy.
In the ﬁrst example, which corresponds to examples used by Umbach
(2004), the shed is deaccented, and has to be understood as referring to
the farm mentioned before. If it were not deaccented, it would mean
something diﬀerent, like the shed that came with the farm. Example
(36b) illustrates VP ellipsis, which refers back to a VP meaning. The
examples in (36c) show that in the double object construction, given
constituents precede constituents that are new. This is a rule with high
functional load in so-called free word order languages, an insight that
goes back to Weil (1844).
As focus constituents typically are not given, and are realized with
greater prosodic prominence, it has been proposed that focus is a com-
plementary notion to givenness so that the latter can ultimately be elim-
inated from theoretical terminology (cf. Daneš 1970; Sgall et al. 1986).
But given constituents can be in focus, and then bear accent. For ex-
ample, it is possible to focus on pronouns, as in Mary only saw [HIM ]F.
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Schwarzschild (1999) develops a more reﬁned theory of interaction be-
tween givenness and focusation, which checks givenness recursively and
states that constituents not in focus must be given, and that focus has
to be applied only when necessary, that is, to prevent that a constituent
is given. But while focus is restricted by givenness in Schwarzschild’s
theory, it cannot be eliminated totally.
We have to assume both focus—the indication of alternatives, which
is expressed by accentuation—and rules of marking given constituents,
e.g., by deaccentuation. As the case of accented pronouns shows, focus
accentuation overrides deaccentuation of given constituents, in the sense
that focus has to be expressed by accent. However, if a larger constituent
is focused, then givenness can inﬂuence the accent rules: The constituent
that normally would bear accent can be deaccented, and accent can be
realized on some other constituent within the focus expression (cf. Féry–
Samek-Lodovici 2006). For example, while in VP focus the accent is
normally realized on the argument, it is realized on the head when the
argument is given:
(37) A: I know that John stole a cookie. What did he do then?
B: He [reTURNED [the cookie]Given]Focus
Incidentally, this suggests an explanation why accent is normally realized
on the argument in cases of wide focus. It is the arguments, not the heads,
that are referential, and therefore the need to express whether they refer
to something given is more pressing. If the normal accentuation rules
state that accent is realized on the argument, then givenness of arguments
can be expressed by deaccenting the argument and accenting the head
instead.
5. Topics
5.1. What is Topic?
The terms ‘topic’ and ‘comment’ are used most frequently to refer to what
has been introduced into linguistic thinking in medieval Arab grammar
by ‘mubtada’ (beginning) and ‘habar’ (news), and later as ‘psychological
subject’ and ‘psychological predicate’ by von der Gabelentz (1869), who
used the ﬁrst term to refer to the object which the speaker is thinking
about, and the second to refer to what the speaker is thinking about
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it. In terms related more closely to communication, topic is the entity
that a speaker identiﬁes about which then information, the comment, is
given. This presupposes that information in human communication and
memory is organized in a certain way so that it can be said to be ‘about’
something. This does not follow from a general deﬁnition of information.
For example, relational databases or sets of possible worlds, both models
for information, do not presuppose any relation of aboutness.
Reinhart (1982) has integrated this notion of topic into a theory of
communication that makes use of the notion of CG. According to her,
new information is not just added to the CG content in the form of
unstructured propositions, but is rather associated with entities, just like
information in a ﬁle card system is associated with individual ﬁle cards
that bear a particular heading. For example, while (38a,b) express the
same proposition, these sentences structure it diﬀerently insofar as (38a)
should be stored as information about Aristotle Onassis, whereas (38b)
should be stored as information about Jacqueline Kennedy.
(a)(38) [Aristotle Onassis]Topic [married Jacqueline Kennedy]Comment.
(b) [Jacqueline Kennedy]Topic [married Aristotle Onassis]Comment.
This leads to the following deﬁnition, which presupposes a ﬁle-card-like
structure of information storage.
(39) The topic constituent identifies the entity or set of entities under which the infor-
mation expressed in the comment constituent should be stored in the CG content.
Just as with the notion of ‘focus’, the notion of ‘topic’ has not been used
in a terminologically clean way. Chafe (1976) called what is deﬁned in
(39) ‘subject’, a term that should be reserved for grammatical subjects
to avoid confusion. Vallduví (1992) and Vallduví–Engdahl (1996) have
used the term ‘link’. In the Prague School, the notion of topic is called
‘theme’, and conﬂated with the one of old information (e.g., Daneš 1970).
We should refrain from this, even if in many cases, topic constituents are
‘old’ in the sense of being inferable from the context. But there are
certainly cases of new topics. The following sentence introduces a new
entity into discourse and, at the same time, uses it as the denotation of
a topic constituent, which amounts to introducing a new ﬁle card in the
CG content.
(40) [A good friend of mine]Topic [married Britney Spears last year]Comment.
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The notions of Topic/Comment are sometimes mixed up with the notions
of Background/Focus. However, as we will see in section 5.2, there are
topics that contain a focus. And the Comment need not be identical to
the focus either:
(41) A: When did [Aristotle Onassis]Topic marry Jacqueline Kennedy?
B: [He]Topic [married her [in 1968]Focus]]Comment.
The deﬁnition in (39) includes the option that a comment is made about
a set of entities. This accounts for the typical way quantiﬁed sentences
are interpreted, in which two sets are related by a quantiﬁer that can be
realized as a determiner or as an adverbial:
(a)(42) Every zebra in the zoo was sick.
(b) Most zebras in the zoo were sick.
(43) Zebras in the zoo usually are sick.
The quantiﬁer in such sentences expresses the extent to which the com-
ment holds for the elements of the set. Assuming that sentences like
(42), (43) are about zebras explains why natural language quantiﬁers are
conservative, that is, why the truth value of sentences that contain a
quantiﬁer can be checked by looking solely at the restrictor set (here the
set of zebras). It is important to note that the restrictor of quantiﬁers
is not always topical, but in the majority of cases it is, and the prop-
erty of conservativity that is motivated in those cases is transferred to
cases in which quantiﬁers are not topical. The idea that the restrictor
set of a quantiﬁer is related to topicality was suggested in Partee (1991),
who also applied it to quantiﬁcation with determiners like most and with
adverbial quantiﬁers like usually.
Sentences typically have only one topic, which can be explained
within Reinhart’s ﬁle-card metaphor: The simplest way to add infor-
mation is to add it on one ﬁle card. But sentences with two or more
topics are possible under certain circumstances, in case a relation be-
tween two ﬁle cards is expressed, as in As for Jack and Jill, they married
last year. A possible way to handle such cases is to introduce a new ﬁle
card that contains information concerning both Jack and Jill. On the
other hand, sentences may have no topic constituent at all, under which
condition they are called thetic, following Marty (1884). But as already
Marty had indicated, this does not mean that such sentences are about
nothing. While they lack a topic constituent, they do have a topic de-
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notation, typically a situation that is given in the context, as in [The
HOUSE is on fire]Comment.
In addition to the notion topic/comment, some theories also assume
a structuring into subject and predicate, or predication basis and predi-
cate, cf. Sasse (1987); Jacobs (2001) and Kuroda (2005). I will not go into
this distinction here in greater detail, but I doubt that it is a distinction
that is to be explained as one of IS.
But then the question is whether topic and comment should be con-
sidered terms relating to IS at all. Without question, topic/comment
structure is a packaging phenomenon; (38a) and (38b) package the same
information diﬀerently, so that it is entered on the ﬁle card for Aris-
totle Onassis and for Jacqueline Kennedy, respectively. But section 2.1
stressed that the packaging must respond to the temporary (recent) com-
mon ground, and this restriction certainly is not always satisﬁed. Assume
that two speakers A, B meet who both know John well, and A says to B:
Did you know? John has married last week. This is an assertion about
John; the information will be entered in the ﬁle card for John in the CG
content of A and B. But this does not necessarily relate to the recent
state of the CG content, it can also respond to the long-term state, e.g.,
a long established and known interest of B in John.
Yet we ﬁnd that topic choice often does respond to properties of the
temporary information state. There is a well-documented tendency to
keep the topic constant over longer stretches of discourse (so-called topic
chains, cf. Givón 1983). Hence, while the notions of topic and comment
fail to be IS terms in the sense that they always relate to the temporary
state of the CG, they do quite often do relate to it, as the topic denotation
in the preceding utterance is the ﬁrst choice for the topic denotation of
the present utterance.
5.2. Contrastive topics
The notion of contrastive topic applies to the topics expressed with a
rising accent in B’s answer in (44). They arguably do not constitute an
information-packaging category in their own right, but represent a com-
bination of topic and focus, as indicated in the example, in the following
sense: They consist of an aboutness topic that contains a focus, which is
doing what focus always does, namely indicating an alternative. In this
case, it indicates an alternative aboutness topic.
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(44) A: What do your siblings do?
B: [My [SISter]Focus]Topic [studies MEDicine]Focus,
and [my [BROther]Focus]Topic is [working on a FREIGHT ship]Focus.
In the ﬁrst clause of B’s response, focus on sister indicates an alternative
to the topic ‘my sister’, namely, ‘my brother’. The typical reason why the
presence of an alternative is highlighted is to indicate that the present
clause does not deliver all the information that is expected. This is why
we often ﬁnd contrastive topics to indicate a strategy of incremental an-
swering in the CG management, as in our example in which an issue is
split into sub-issues. This has been assumed to be the function of con-
trastive topics in Roberts (1996) and Büring (1997; 2003). It is pointed
out in this literature that there are accommodation phenomena that af-
fect what we call CG management. In the following case, contrastive
topic accommodates a more general question, Who was where?
(45) A: Where were you (at the time of the murder)?
B: [[I]Focus]Topic [was [at HOME]Focus]Comment.
However, it should be noted that we ﬁnd contrastive topics also in cases
in which the idea of a questioning strategy is not easily applicable. In
example (46) the answer given does not satisfy the expectations expressed
in the question, in combination with a rising intonation in the comment
that indicates that the assertion, while being the best one to be made,
may not satisfy all needs.
(46) A: Does your sister speak Portuguese?
B: [My [BROther]Focus]Topic [[DOES]Focus]Comment.
Notice that focus within a topic is interpreted as usual: indicating the
presence of alternatives, in this case, alternative topics. Focus is marked
by (rising) accent, but it is not the main accent of the sentence, which
is on a constituent of the comment.
6. Frame setting and delimitation
6.1. What is frame setting?
Frame setting, according to Jacobs (2001), is often not separated clearly
from aboutness topic, and Chafe (1976), who stresses their diﬀerence,
uses the term ‘topic’, in contrast to ‘subject’, for precisely this function.
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What is it? Statements like (47) certainly should not be entered under
a ﬁle card about the health situation, and the topic of (48) is Daimler-
Chrysler, not Germany or America.
(47) A: How is John?
B: {Healthwise/As for his health}, he is [FINE]Focus.
(48) A: How is business going for Daimler-Chrysler?
B: [In GERmany]Frame the prospects are [GOOD]Focus,
but [in AMErica]Frame they are [losing MOney]Focus
It is often said that adverbials like healthwise or in Germany are frame
setters that set the frame in which the following expression should be
interpreted; according to Chafe, frame setting is used “to limit the ap-
plicability of the main predication to a certain restricted domain”. It is
still unclear how this should be understood more precisely. For cases like
(47) which contain an evaluative predicate (fine) that is unspeciﬁed with
respect to the dimension of evaluation (ﬁnancially, healthwise, spiritually,
etc.), this can be rendered more precisely by assuming that it is the task
of the frame-setting adverbial to specify that dimension. Similarly, (48)
has a situation dimension that is speciﬁed by the frame setter. But we
also have statements like As for his health situation, he had a bypass op-
eration recently, which cannot be explained in this way. It appears that
frame setters indicate the general type of information that can be given
about an individual. A possible implementation of this idea is that they
systematically restrict the language (the notions that can be expressed)
in certain ways: notions like he won a lot of money cannot be interpreted
in the scope of healthwise, and notions like he is doing fine have to be
restricted to the indicated dimension.
In any case, in dialogues like (47) alternative frames play a role, and
hence we can assume that explicit frame setters always are focused in the
sense of section 3.1. They choose one out of a set of frames and state
that the proposition holds within this frame. If there is no alternative
perspective to be considered, then there is no need for an explicit frame
setter either. As explicit frame setters always indicate alternatives, they
clearly belong to IS. More speciﬁcally, they relate to CG management,
as they imply that there are other aspects for which other predications
might hold. In this they are similar to contrastive topics (section 5.2.),
as they too split up a complex issue into sub-issues.
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6.2. Delimitation
The similarity between contrastive topics and frame setters mentioned
above is worth to be looked at more closely. What contrastive topics and
frame setters have in common is that they express that, for the commu-
nicative needs at the current point of discourse, the present contribution
only gives a limited or incomplete answer. In the case of contrastive
topics, the current CG management contains the expectation that infor-
mation about a more comprehensive, or a distinct, entity is given; con-
trastive topic indicates that the topic of the sentence diverges from this
expectation. With frame setters, the current CG management contains
the expectation that information of a diﬀerent, e.g., more comprehensive,
type is given, and the frame setter indicates that the information actually
provided is restricted to the particular dimension speciﬁed. This more
general view is suggested in Büring’s notion of contrastive topics, which
do not have to be topics in the sense of aboutness topics.
Büring develops a formal model of this notion within the representa-
tion framework of Alternative Semantics: The contrastive topic induces
a set of alternatives over and above the set of alternatives that are in-
troduced by the focus within the predication, ending up with sets of sets
of alternatives.
(49) A: Which subjects do your siblings study?
B: [My SISter]Contrastive Topic [Comment studies [PoMOlogy]Focus]
= {{x studies y | y ∈ {pomology, olericulture, . . . }
| x ∈ {sister, brother, . . . }}
= {{sister studies pomology, sister studies olericulture, . . . },
{brother studies pomology, brother studies olericulture, . . . }}
This incorporates the important observation that contrastive topics al-
ways occur in expressions that have another focus outside of the con-
trastive topic, a rule that holds for frame setters as well. But one should
distinguish the formal implementation of delimitation from its commu-
nicative purpose. The following is an attempt to characterize this in a
most general way:
(50) A Delimitator a in an expression [. . .a. . .bFocus. . . ] always comes with a focus
within a that generates alternatives a′. It indicates that the current informa-
tional needs of the CG are not wholly satisfied by [. . .a. . .bFocus. . . ], but would be
satisfied by additional expressions of the general form [. . .a′. . .b′Focus. . . ].
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In this deﬁnition, no reference to (aboutness) topic or frame setting is
made. This allows for cases like (51) that do not plausibly belong to
either category:
(51) [An [inGEnious] mathematician]Delim he is [NOT]Focus.
The sentence suggests alternative statements like He is a mediocre math-
ematician hold. The deﬁnition in (50) is also neutral as to the speech
act type of the expression, which explains why delimitations occur in
questions and commands as in (52):
(52) And when did you read [DostoYEVsky]Delim in school?
Delimitation indicates that the respective question does not express the
full communicative needs as there are other questions at issue, such as
When did you read Shakespeare in school?
If delimitations do what they are suggested to do here, then this
explains why they often help to indicate a certain questioning strategy.
If it is explicitly marked that an expression is suboptimal as far as the
communicative needs of the moment are concerned, then one important
reason for this is that the current communicative move only responds to
a more local need, and not yet to the global need of the CG. By this they
help to structure CG management by distinguishing between local and
more global communicative goals.
7. Cohesion and rhetorical structure
The notion of a structured set of questions under discussion that has
been developed by a variety of researchers, such as Klein–von Stutterheim
(1987); van Kuppevelt (1994); Roberts (1996) and Büring (2003), leads to
a richer understanding of CG management. We have seen that delimiters
can create and respond to such structures.
I would like to point out that beyond the idea of question stacks and
question trees, linguistic communication is built on a rich structure of
discourse relations, as investigated in a number of theories such as in the
study of cohesion in Halliday–Hasan (1976), and in Rhetorical Structure
Theory (Mann–Thompson 1988). Structured Discourse Representation
Theory, as developed in Asher–Lascarides (2004), shows that there is an
interaction between discourse structure and possible anaphoric relations.
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CG management cannot be described without referring to the strate-
gies used to narrate events or make arguments. For example, there are
strategies that ﬁrst lay out the premises and then lead to a conclusion,
and there are others that start with the conclusion and then motivate it
or elaborate on it. This will result in locally distinct structures of the
CG, and each individual sentence will respond to those. In this sense,
the devices studied in these theories, like discourse particles and intona-
tional meaning, squarely belong to Information Structure as envisioned
by Chafe.
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